Bolivia: The challenges of the next Government of Rodrigo Paz

By Franz Flores Castro

The center-left candidate of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Rodrigo Paz, won with 54 percent of the votes, obtaining almost ten points ahead of his rival, Jorge Tuto Quiroga. This victory not only puts an end to two decades of hegemony of the Movement towards Socialism (MAS), led by Evo Morales, but also confers solid legitimacy to the new Administration. However, the challenges that loom in the political sphere for the Peace Government, which will take office on November 9, are considerable.

The first big test for Paz will be the consolidation of his power base in the legislature. The main weakness lies in the fact that the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) functioned as a “womb for rent”, an instrumental structure without social or national roots that supported the candidacy. Although Paz capitalized on the vote of the “hard core” of the MAS in several regions, he did not inherit the party structure or the capacity for mobilization of his predecessor. This partisan weakness generates two points of friction.

Multiple factions could emerge within the PDC bench, each seeking shares of power. The tensions that were already evident between Paz and his running mate, Edman Lara, during the campaign could be exacerbated, complicating the governance of the Executive and the management of the Plurinational Legislative Assembly (ALP).

Likewise, Paz will have to negotiate consensus with other parties. Although it has the explicit support of Samuel Doria Medina’s Unidad, which materialized in the runoff, relations with Quiroga’s party, LIBRE, are more tense. Although they share ideological affinities (market economy, external openness, respect for institutions), the consequences of the aggressive electoral campaign will make a possible alliance difficult. The simple majority in the ALP is assured with the alliance of the PDC with Unidad, but for more far-reaching reforms, such as an eventual constitutional change, it needs to approach and agree with LIBRE, which holds the key to the two-thirds.

A second crucial challenge will be the relationship with powerful and decisive social movements. The support of these organizations for the PDC formula, although it was a determining factor in its victory, does not guarantee unconditional loyalty. With a notable track record of political empowerment, these organizations will seek to protect their privileges and, if they feel disadvantaged, could resort to mobilizations that threaten social stability. Your support will be essential to legitimize any economic and social adjustment. The management of tensions with these sectors and the way in which the new Government manages the legacy of “masismo” will be vital to maintain the stability of the country. In many ways these are anti-system forces that can block the Peace Government.

The capacity of the new Government to undertake any economic and social policy is conditioned by overcoming these two political challenges: it needs a legislature aligned with the Executive and effective coordination with social movements.

Once the political obstacles have been resolved, the next great challenge is the economic one. Peace comes to a country in crisis, with a shortage of dollars, inflation and declining international reserves. The elimination of fuel subsidies, a crucial measure for fiscal sustainability, could provoke serious social unrest. The precedent of 2010, when Evo Morales had to reverse a similar adjustment due to pressure from social movements, underlines the delicacy of this situation.

October 19 not only marked the end of a political era, but also raised a crucial question: is Bolivia heading towards a true transformation or towards a continuation of the MAS model by other means?

The answer to this question will define the direction of the country in the coming years. If the new Government of Rodrigo Paz opts for the first route, it will be essential to address structural reforms that allow strengthening democratic institutions. These reforms would include: reducing presidentialism and generating a justice system free of political influence.

If, on the contrary, the Peace Government focuses only on solving the most pressing economic problems—such as inflation and shortages of hydrocarbons—, ignoring their root causes, the MAS model could persist. This model is characterized by a narrow-based economy, without significant industrialization or stable job creation.

It is likely that the MAS, now without a parliamentary majority, will offer initial room for maneuver to the new Administration. However, the political picture will not be complete until next year’s subnational elections. Only then will the new correlation of forces in the country be defined more clearly. For now, Bolivia takes its first steps outside the hegemonic domain of the MAS and the shadow of Morales.

Franz Flores is a political scientist, professor and researcher at the San Francisco Xavier University (Sucre, Bolivia). Doctor in Social Sciences with a mention in Political Studies from FLACSO-Ecuador.