The electoral successes of the so-called radical right, extreme right, new right, populist right, national-conservative or even neo-fascist right have been bringing great concern and some panic to the Left and the left, to the center and even to the “right of the Left”.
The ideological characterization of these parties and movements has been biased by the hegemony in the Academy and in the social media of the enemies of the wave they represent.
Although they tend to be characterized caricaturally and as a block, these movements are very different from each other, even in terms of their guiding values – some are more conservative, others more popular, some more liberal in economics, others more dirigiste. But they have two common characteristics: hostility to globalism and what we can call the cultural radicalism of the new left. For this reason, they are all nationalists, although they differ in religion, customs and economy, which, moreover, ends up being typical of nationalisms.
The success of these movements is directly related, in the European and American West, to the reaction to the consequences for the working classes and middle classes of post-Cold War deindustrialization and relocation. From here came a relative enrichment of the super-rich and their techno-bureaucratic courts, of the public and private sector, and an impoverishment or penalization of the middle and working classes.
That is why Werner Sombart’s studies and reflections on the distinction between industrial capitalism and financial capitalism have once again become very topical. When 2% or 3% of the very rich multiply their fortunes and the vast majority become relatively poor; when there are salary ranges in European and American companies equivalent to 600 times between the highest and lowest salary; When in the United States 60,000 factories closed in 30 years, it is no wonder the popularity of populisms.
On the other hand, the radical Left abandoned “social causes”, employment justice and the defense of workers, to dedicate itself to fracturing causes of a thousand genders and the rights of existing and imaginary minorities. This agenda – which recalls the new utopias and “imaginary Marxisms” of the 60s, in a delirious post-modern version – is far from being popular outside “liberal-chic” circles.
This anti-globalism – and consequently, the preference for nationalism and the defense of national identity – and the reinforcement of traditional values or, at least, the defense of biological reality and customs in the face of the experimentalism of new and artificial identities, are the common denominator of what, for convenience, we can call the Euro-American “new Right”.
For the rest, these parties follow the customs of their communities: for example, the French Rassemblement National or the German AFD, which appear in more secularized societies, tend to be less conservative in matters of customs and more tolerant in relation to abortion or the institutionalization of homosexuality; The Poles of Law and Justice or the Spaniards of Vox are more traditionalists, and the Italian Fratelli will be, in these matters, at the “center”.
There are also various positions regarding state interventionism in the Economy, between liberals and even ultraliberals and dirigiste.
Above all, in accepting freedom of choice according to different national values, the Right has learned something. But he also learned to unite to resist common enemies.
Political scientist and writer
The author writes according to the old spelling
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