What do we know about Pakistan’s bold, cautious maneuver? | policy

Pakistan seems to have caught the winds of geopolitics at the right time. Last month, Pakistan signed a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia. Under this bold agreement, an attack on one party is considered an attack on the other party, and it is a dramatic escalation in security guarantees, within a region full of rivalries and conflicts.

Meanwhile, Islamabad has sent samples of rare earth minerals to the United States and is seeking to explore deeper export agreements. For its part, Washington seems interested, for the first time in years, in dealing with Pakistan as more than just a “marginal problem.”

These steps indicate some kind of momentum. Some commentators in Islamabad and Riyadh have described it as a “renaissance” in Pakistani foreign policy, and a belated recognition of Pakistan’s strategic importance.

The presence of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif at the peace summit on Gaza also reinforced this impression, at a moment when it seemed as if Pakistan was returning to the forefront in the Islamic world.

Behind appearances: motives of necessity

But what is happening is not a sudden miracle, but rather the product of necessity, pressure, and realignment in a highly volatile region. Behind these shiny images lie harder facts.

First engine Behind the momentum of Pakistani foreign policy is the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The sudden American exit left a vacuum that Washington is still unable to fill.

With a hostile Iran on one side, and the Taliban entrenched in Kabul on the other, the United States needs a counterbalancing force in the region. Here, Pakistan emerges again, thanks to its geographical location, its intelligence networks, and its long entanglement with the Afghan file.

US President Donald Trump’s demand that the Taliban hand over the Bagram Air Base, five years after the signing of the withdrawal agreement, highlights the extent of the United States’ search for influence in the region. If this bet fails, Pakistan remains the only natural alternative: a country that has the logistical capacity and political ties that allow Washington to maintain a foothold in the region.

The second factor It complicates the relationship between the United States and India. Over the past decade, Washington has pushed New Delhi to become more integrated into its strategy for the two-ocean region. Indo-Pacific, which gave India an increasing global presence in which Pakistan sees a direct threat.

However, tensions between India and America worsened. Disagreements over visas and customs duties continued to escalate, and India’s rapprochement with Moscow raised concern in Washington.

The visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Beijing last August was a clear indication that India is ready to bet on its relationship with China.
Economically, Modi’s “Make in India” program, inspired by low-cost export strategies in East Asia, is a potential threat to American industry.

For Trump, seeking to maintain balance in Asia, Pakistan returns to the scene as a balancing card against India’s rapprochement with Beijing.

As for the third factorAnd the most fragile thing is mineral diplomacy. The focus of rapprochement between Islamabad and Washington is based on promises to provide access to rare earth minerals, many of which are concentrated in the troubled province of Balochistan.

On paper, this cooperation appears win-win: Pakistan gets investments, and the United States secures rare strategic resources.
But the reality is much darker.

Balochistan remains the poorest province in Pakistan despite decades of extraction and mining. Infrastructure projects are abandoned, airports are empty, and unemployment remains stubbornly high.

The passage of the Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act, 2025 has intensified public anger. This law, which was approved by the Regional Legislative Council last March, gives the central government in Islamabad the power to recommend mining policies and grant licenses in the region, which sparked opposition from across the political spectrum.

Critics of the law believe that it undermines the region’s autonomy and returns the centralization of power to Islamabad. Even right-wing religious parties such as the Association of Islamic Scholars (JUI-F), which rarely intersect with nationalist groups, expressed their opposition, viewing the law as another attempt to rob local communities of their legitimate rights to the region’s resources.

This wave of opposition reveals a dangerous trend: exploitation of resources without the involvement of local populations leads to anger and rebellion.
By opening mineral resources to foreign investors, without providing real social guarantees, the Pakistani government risks deepening isolation in a region that has long suffered from conflict and marginalization.

What looks like “national rescue” in Islamabad may be seen as “usurpation of rights” in Quetta.

A shift driven by pressure, not a real renaissance

When we look at all the previous factors, we find that what is described as a “renaissance” in Pakistani foreign policy is nothing more than a calculated maneuver under increasing pressure.

The vacuum in Afghanistan, the reset of US-Indian relations, and the bet on mineral diplomacy all explain Pakistan’s rise in the global diplomatic scene. But none of them address the fragility of the internal foundation.
Washington may abandon Pakistan once its priorities change. As for India, its position in the American strategy will not disappear. Balochistan’s grievances will worsen if the deals continue in their current form, based on exploitation and exclusion.

We should not draw the wrong conclusions from the scene in Riyadh, Shahbaz Sharif’s appearance at the Gaza summit, or the polite handshakes in Washington.
Pakistan is maneuvering cautiously, making improvised arrangements under pressure, and trying to turn weaknesses into opportunities.

But the real test lies inside. Unless Islamabad confronts governance failures, regional disparities, and loss of political trust, foreign policy gains will remain fragile and vulnerable to erosion. In the end, neither a defense agreement nor a minerals deal can compensate for the absence of a stable social contract within Pakistan. This is the real renaissance that the country is still waiting for.