“The war will last three months if things go well, and perhaps 8 months if things do not go well,” this is what the head of the British Army’s infantry during World War I, General Archibald Murray, thought in his estimate of the duration of the war at its beginning, but it lasted 4 years at the time.
Wars, in fact, involve a high degree of “uncertainty,” which is what US President Donald Trump, who tends to achieve rapid achievements in the world of politics and international relations, did not realize, as if he were in the world of economics.
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Since the start of his election campaign on his way to the White House for the second time, he has waved his intention to end wars around the world, including the Russian-Ukrainian war, which he exaggerated about his ability to end “within 24 hours” of his accession to the presidency, which he failed to do even about 10 months after winning the elections.
This fallacy is the same on which the “escalation ladder” theory is based, saying: “No one can fall to the top,” assuming that the parties to the conflict ascend specific and equivalent levels in the escalation path according to a “step by step” policy, without the combatants crossing the threshold of escalation towards a comprehensive and open conflict.
In the Russian-Ukrainian war, the United States is trying to control the conflict within the limits of the threshold from which it does not slide into a direct confrontation with Russia, but it may risk an uncalculated Russian response if it supplies Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles.
On the other hand, Moscow does not show a willingness to give up its demands to annex the Ukrainian lands it occupied, and is trying to respond to American threats with similar escalatory measures, in a race in which both sides seek not to overtake the other.
Tomahawk stick… Will it subjugate the Kremlin?
The US administration showed discrepancies in its dealings with Russia and the war in Ukraine. After the warmth that characterized relations with Trump’s return to the White House, and opposition to a European resolution at the United Nations to condemn the war on Ukraine, it appears that President Vladimir Putin’s intransigence towards ending the fighting has frustrated Trump.
Therefore, Trump’s statements shifted from courting Moscow to threatening additional sanctions against it and imposing customs duties on its trading partners. China and India, even threatening to deliver Tomahawk missiles to Kyiv.
Tomahawk missiles fall within the category of long-range, subsonic cruise missiles. They are usually launched from the sea to attack targets deep within the enemy’s territory. They operate with jet engines and are designed to fly at low altitude. The range of modern versions is about 1,600 km, at a cost that may reach $2.5 million per missile.
With a range like this, Ukraine’s acquisition of these missiles will place the Russian capital, Moscow – which is only approximately 800 kilometers away from Kiev – under its range of fire, in addition to logistical centers, airports, and command centers that Kiev cannot currently target with such destructive and accurate munitions.
But the matter does not depend only on the range. What distinguishes this family of missiles is the integration of several elements in addition to the large operational range, such as the ability to fly at low altitudes to hide from radars, and multi-layered guidance systems, which makes it a preferred tool for military planners to strike sensitive targets while reducing risks on launch pads.
The most prominent tactical advantage is the ability to direct and update in flight, as the missile can be redirected or put on hold until more accurate targeting information becomes available, and the attack can even be canceled if field data changes.
This flexibility gives commanders the ability to modify plans in real time, reducing the chances of unwanted collateral damage or hitting the wrong targets.
But the effectiveness of the Tomahawk cannot be separated from the intelligence and logistical infrastructure that supports it. When missiles are integrated with reconnaissance, surveillance, communications, command and control systems, planning safe paths and updating targets becomes possible, which increases the probability of mission success and reduces operational risks.
In other words, the language of numbers and technical capabilities alone does not tip the balance of military superiority, but rather the military effectiveness that Kiev can gain if it obtains missiles, as well as using them in the correct way in managing the conflict.
Effectiveness here means the extent of the ability to translate resources into actual power on the battlefield, and therefore there is a difference between the potential capabilities provided by weapons, and what the state is actually able to do on the battlefield. Within this framework, the importance of integrating levels of military activity emerges to achieve realistic achievements on the one hand, while limiting the impact of the opponent’s countermeasures, on the other hand, and employing all of this in the international diplomatic theater of war.
Operationally, Tomahawk missiles are typically launched from ships and submarines, which Ukraine does not possess. Although the new versions can be launched from land using the Typhoon launchers, these platforms are few in the US Army and the value of each of them is $6.2 million.
It is also impossible to say with certainty the number of missiles that the United States can abandon. Despite the enthusiasm shown by the US President at the beginning when he threatened to send “a few thousand” of them to Ukraine, reports indicate that it is not possible to send more than 50 missiles, which once again reflects the discrepancy between reality and Trump’s propaganda threats.
Therefore, the most prominent loophole in the effectiveness of the Tomahawk missiles for Ukraine lies in the limited number that it may obtain, while it needs a barrage of missiles to create the desired effect to push Russia towards modifying its behavior and inclining towards stopping the war, while Russian behavior does not suggest this.
Moscow has limited options
In the logic of escalation, this threat is classified as a strategic message directed to Putin to push him towards modifying his uncompromising position, but it may require a Russian response that exceeds the expectations of the Trump administration. Putin stated that Kiev’s acquisition of Tomahawk missiles would represent “a qualitatively new stage of escalation,” which is what his Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also warned about.
These warnings were reinforced by the escalating waves of Russian bombing on Ukraine, and the flights of drones witnessed over the past weeks by European Union countries, for which the EU countries accused Moscow of responsibility.
When an escalatory step is employed in the context of pressure on the opponent, it aims to restrain him and search for a loophole that leads to reducing the escalation, but it may also provoke him and push him to take a similar or more severe escalatory response, perhaps to maintain the balance of deterrence. Here lies the danger of losing control over the course of events, and this is what the parties to the conflict are aware of, even though the momentum of wars by nature pushes towards the unconscious.
Russia now has few escalatory options. The threat to use a nuclear arsenal – which worked in the past – is no longer effective, as repetition has lost its effect. The Russian army also continues to bomb Ukrainian cities and infrastructure with large waves of missiles and drones, as well as ongoing ground attacks.
But threatening to expand the scope of the conflict to include targets in Europe may be the best Russian option now, even if it is limited to threats and intimidation only, with the risks of uncalculated European responses.
In this context, the Kremlin is using strategic missile tests to enhance its propaganda threats and improve its negotiating position.
Therefore, on October 22, 2025, Putin conducted a strategic nuclear forces exercise that included land, sea, and air forces. Russian forces launched a Yars intercontinental ballistic missile from the Plesetsk space base, another Sineva from the Bryansk nuclear-powered submarine, and cruise missiles from TU-95M strategic bombers. “S.”
Sergei Ryabkov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, described these maneuvers as “military measures” in response to the “aggressive policies” of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
However, a review of similar Russian military activities indicates that these exercises are annual and routine procedures, as Moscow conducted similar exercises over the past three years, also in October, so that the options it has had less impact, and attention is directed towards other actual options.
Doubts about Trump’s seriousness
After weeks of threat, and hours before his meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House on October 17, 2025, Trump announced plans to hold a new summit between them in the Hungarian capital, Budapest, after a phone call with Putin.
Following his meeting with Zelensky, the US President insisted that his Russian counterpart wanted to end the war, in a striking shift from escalatory to conciliatory tone.
But Trump later canceled the meeting because he did not want to hold a “wasted meeting” – as he described it – after Russia refused to make concessions. White House officials claimed that there were no plans for Trump and Putin to meet “in the near future,” all following a call between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov on October 20, in which Lavrov insisted on Ukraine’s request to cede Donetsk and Luhansk provinces.
This was followed by the US Treasury Department announcing on October 22 that the Office of Foreign Assets Control imposed additional sanctions on Russia, and the Trump administration also lifted restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Storm Shadow missiles to strike Russian territory. This coincided with the targeting of a chemical factory in the city of Bryansk Oblast that produces gunpowder, explosives, and rocket fuel components.
These decisions indicate the nature of the American escalation and the ceiling to which it adheres, through the alignment between economic tools and military measures that enhance Ukrainian capabilities to exert pressure on the battlefield, in the hope of pushing Putin to concede.
The US administration’s steps are consistent with its efforts to end the war in Ukraine following the recent Gaza agreement, by pressuring Moscow without crossing the threshold of escalation towards a direct confrontation with Russia, which casts doubt on the seriousness of Trump’s threats to help Kiev, and the doubt increases as the Ukrainian file competes with the White House’s priorities in the Pacific region in confronting China.
Hard peace
It is clear that the United States does not want to go to a comprehensive confrontation with Russia, as its priority is to look to the Chinese tide, and therefore it maintains control of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in an effort to find solutions that enhance the image of the “peacemaker” Trump, despite his not winning the Nobel Peace Prize.
On the other hand, Russia exerted much of its human and material capabilities in Ukraine, not to return to square one in the face of NATO, but rather to preserve the gains it had achieved with great difficulty in a war that it thought was fleeting and easy to achieve.
Therefore, the practical space now seems narrow, which pushes the Trump administration to reduce the level of fighting, not to resolve the conflict completely and to enhance the level of deterrence in Ukraine in the long term. However, it clings to granting legal legitimacy to the Russian occupation of Russian lands, especially the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces. This is a formula closer to a truce than peace, as it stops fighting but leaves the main conflicts unresolved.
What is noteworthy is that Washington is moving away from its commitments to Europe and NATO, in a greater adoption of the slogan “America First,” as it establishes US relations with allies on the basis of “American interests,” not on the basis of joint commitments and guarantees, which may raise actual divisions in the NATO structure, and fulfill Russian hopes in this field.
European concerns reflect the changing nature of relations between the United States and Europe, and the transformation of the capitals of the Old Continent into political rivals to the White House according to diverging interests, priorities, and dealing with challenges, whether in the defense and economic sectors, relations with Russia, or Middle East policies.
The “America First” policy will reinforce a more independent European trend that limits Washington’s influence in the region. Perhaps the most important manifestation of this discrepancy will be the emergence of Europe as a single independent pole that is bolder on the international scene, taking tougher positions towards China, confronting Russia more firmly and competing with American interests. This is reflected in many studies published by research and study centers on the reliability of the American guarantee for the security of Europe and other allies, and how to defend the continent in isolation from American power.
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